REVIEW - An Analysis of Malaysia’s 12th General Election

1.    Introduction

In our pre-election analysis, we estimated that the Opposition parties will win about 50 parliamentary seats and face a very strong challenge from DAP-Keadilan in Penang. We also warned of the strong wind blowing in the Indian and Chinese communities towards the Opposition. We did not and could not then anticipate the equally strong wave of Malay support for the Opposition which resulted in the Opposition gaining 82 seats in Parliament, denying the Barisan Nasional of its two-thirds majority, the first time since the May 1969 General Election. We had in our pre-election analysis noted the possibility of a divided outcome with a strong Malay government against a strong non-Malay Opposition. However, this did not materialize as Malay support for the Opposition was also strong resulting in multi racial Keadilan winning 31 seats and PAS 23 seat in Parliament. In fact, the popular votes obtained by UMNO (35.5%) and combined PAS/Keadilan (34.8%) was almost equal. Whilst the loss of Penang state to the Opposition did not come as a surprise after the first week of campaign with massive turnout at DAP ceramahs and large donations collected on the spot for the DAP candidates, the fall of Perak and Selangor was totally unexpected. What happened? What caused the massive swing?

Some facts on the 12th General Election should be noted and analysed. The Barisan Nasional within Peninsular Malaysia failed to obtain a majority of popular votes cast. It only obtained 49% of the popular votes in Peninsular Malaysia whereas the Opposition had the majority of popular votes – 51%. UMNO won 35% of popular votes against 34.8% won by PAS and Keadilan. Although the Barisan Nasional won 140 seats in Parliament, 54 seats came from Sabah and Sarawak. So, without Sabah and Sarawak, Barisan Nasional will not have even obtained a simple majority in Parliament. If the Federal Territory was to be considered as a state, the Barisan Nasional actually lost 6 states. In Negeri Sembilan, it survives with only a 4-seat majority. In Pahang, Barisan Nasional even lost the state capital, Kuantan. Even the Barisan Nasional fortress of Johor was successfully penetrated by the Opposition this time with both DAP and PAS winning seats. There are no safe bastions for Barisan Nasional anymore.

Although, the Chinese and Indian votes have decisively swung to the DAP and Keadilan, causing MCA, MIC and Gerakan to lose massive support, it was totally unexpected for UMNO to lose in urban and semi-urban Malay seats like Titiwangsa and Lembah Pantai (in Kuala Lumpur city), Shah Alam, Hulu Langat, Kuala Langat, Kuala Selangor, Gombak, Ampang, Sungei Petani, Merbok, Kulim, Nibong Tebal, Balik Pulau (in Penang), Parit Buntar and Bagan Serai in Perak. Barisan Nasional even loss Kuantan – the capital of Pahang and Indera Mahkota. With increasing urbanization with the urban population projected to increase to 73% in 2020, up from 62% in 2000, can UMNO prevent a slide in urban Malay votes? What made the urban Malays desert UMNO? This question needs to be addressed. For the MCA and MIC, it was clearly their worst ever electoral performance ever. In 1969, MCA won 13 out of 24 seats contested (54%), whereas this year MCA only won 37.5% of parliament seats contested. Gerakan was totally wiped out in Penang – its stronghold. The DAP campaigned that a vote for MCA or Gerakan is a vote for UMNO to capitalize on the anger of the Chinese community over UMNO. Hence, the track record of MCA and Gerakan was ignored with an emotional swing against UMNO.

2. What the Election Results Mean

Several broad conclusions can be drawn from the 12th General Election:-

(i) It is a seismic shift in Malaysian politics. A political tsunami as the Star headlines said. The old ways of campaigning may no longer work. Putting fear into voters minds did not work. The use of mainstream media to create spin or to demonise the opposition was detested by urban voters and had a counter-effect instead. From feedback, many urban voters were turned off by the spin especially in NST and Star.


(ii) The victory of DAP, Keadilan and PAS in many areas showed that voters do not buy the argument that the Chinese won’t support PAS and DAP won’t get Malay votes. As Dr. Farish Noor reported from the PAS Headquarters in Kota Baru on Saturday night (polling night), Kelantan PAS supporters cheered when the DAP gained control of Penang. So the notion Malays won’t support DAP was debunked that night in Kota Baru.


(iii) Makkal Sakhti (People Power), the cry of HINDRAF, caused a tidal wave of support from the Indian community towards the opposition. This seismic shift of Indian voters contributed to the defeat of many Barisan Nasional candidates, not only MIC candidates.


(iv) The Barisan Nasional’s brand of race-based politics is no longer an attractive proposition to voters. Chinese voters deserted MCA and Gerakan. Indian voters swung away from MIC. Many Malay voters switched to Keadilan, making Keadilan the biggest opposition party with 31 parliament seats. The Opposition parties won, not on race-based issues but across a range of issues that cuts across ethnic lines. The MCA and MIC lost whilst trying to portray themselves as defenders of their race. UMNO lost ground to Keadilan even with Anwar calling for an end to NEP. Is this then, a new paradigm for Malaysian politics that Malaysian voters are more taken in by wider national issues such as corruption, crime, cost of living, social justice and human rights which cuts across all ethnic groups rather than narrow ethnic issues that favour any particular race? Even MCA championing the cause of Chinese schools didn’t get much support from the Chinese community. But, PAS delivered votes to DAP and Chinese voters supported both PAS and Keadilan. Should MCA remain purely a Chinese party when it lost more Chinese votes to the DAP or should it become a multi-racial party and widen its appeal to non-Chinese? This has set the stage for a new era of multi-racial politics in Malaysia, perhaps the beginning of a two-party system which is healthy in any democracy.


(v) The loss of Penang, Kedah, Selangor and Perak can perhaps be partially attributed to complacency in the Barisan Nasional camp. Over-confidence in a proven track record may be another factor. In Penang, the non-Malay voters were unhappy with Gerakan for being unable or unwilling to stand up to UMNO. However, the Opposition’s ability to capture, in particular, Penang and Selangor, the jewels in the crown so to speak, and even Perak to a lesser extent, will enable DAP and Keadilan to attempt to provide a new model of governance, which if they succeed, could further strengthen their grips on these states in the next General Elections and extend their support in other states like Negeri Sembilan (remember earlier point: Barisan Nasional only have 4 seat majority in Negeri Sembilan). However, if the DAP and Keadilan mess up, they will lose their opportunity and the voters in the 3 states Penang, Perak and Selangor may revert to the Barisan Nasional. It is however, unlikely DAP and Keadilan will squander their chance. It is left to be seen if the new State Governments in Penang, Perak and Selangor can deliver. If so, expect them to control these states for at least two terms if the state governments are administered well with good governance, accountability and transparency.


(vi) The point has also to be made that never in the history of Malaysia has the Prime Minister ever lost his own home state. In Penang, UMNO/Barisan Nasional only retained 2 parliamentary seats, that of the Prime Minister and Second Finance Minister Tan Sri Nor Mohamed Yakcop. The 12th General Election by any reckoning is UMNO’s worst-ever performance, worse than in 1969 and 1999.

3. What Caused the Swing to the Opposition

The political tsunami was brought about by various factors, foremost of which is the perceived arrogance of power. All racial groups – Malays, Chinese and Indians have the perception that the Barisan Nasional did not hear or listen to the voice of the people. The Barisan Nasional mishandled the Bersih and HINDRAF protests. This show no tolerance for public assemblies and no outlet for grievances which resulted in the aggrieved parties voting against the Barisan Nasional in the ballot boxes. The Barisan Nasional’s over-confidence and poor intelligence failed to identify growing anger and frustration of the people. The Prime Minister’s challenge to Opposition supporters not to demonstrate but to take it to the ballot box also made many fence sitters and opposition sympathizers to vote for the opposition. The Barisan Nasional failed to effectively read the mood on the ground. Many urban voters in particular the fence sitters were put off by the propaganda, spin and one-sided coverage on TV and in NST and Star.

A contributory factor could be internal bickering over the choice of candidates within the Barisan Nasional component parties not only in UMNO but also in MCA and Gerakan. Apart from the above, other factors also contributed to the unprecedented swing in support to the Opposition. These can be attributed as the 9C’s:-

(i)                 Change : A massive mood swing brought about by the opposition’s promise of change and reform.

(ii)                 Crime : Growing anger at the seeming inability of the Federal Government to tackle crime effectively.

(iii)               Cost of Living : Rising frustration over increases in the cost of living.

(iv)              Corruption : Growing perception that corruption has worsened over the past four years. (v)               Courts : Disgust over the Lingham enquiry and concern about judicial independence.

(vi)              Convergence of Issues : All these issues coming to a head at the same time and perception that government is not listening or effectively addressing them. There is really no one single big issue but a convergence of issues that caused people to be dissatisfied and angry with the Barisan Nasional.

(vii)             Communications Technology : The power of the internet and blogs to provide alternative information, that is downloaded, printed and distributed even to kampungs and new villages. With the spin in NST, more people trust the blogs more than the mainstream media.

(viii)            Credible Leadership : For the first time, the Opposition was able to present credible leadership and credible alternatives. The Anwar factor is pivotal. More than the 1998 reformasi campaign this year is much more an Anwar-coordinated campaign. DAP, Keadilan and PAS put up young, credible candidates. Lim Guan Eng, a Monash economics and accounting graduate, taking charge of Penang instead of his father Lim Kit Siang provided a younger and less belligerent face to the electorate backed by credible candidates like Prof. Ramasamy, Lim Chin Tiong and Jeff Ooi.

(ix)              Campaign Strategy : The Barisan Nasional’s campaign strategy was much of the same. The old school approach – some carrots and sticks. It offered development on the one hand, it threatens on the other, warning the Chinese and Indian communities that they will have no representation in government. The Chinese and Indian voters didn’t buy this argument this time. At one point in Penang, feedback from many Chinese voters is they don’t mind not even having a Chinese Chief Minister to teach the Barisan Nasional a lesson. Promises and fear didn’t work this time. UMNO also took Malay voters for granted. On the other hand, the Opposition’s strategy was low-key, humble and non-threatening. PAS didn’t speak of an Islamic State. DAP didn’t campaign to capture Penang as was the case during Tanjung I, II and III. All DAP asked for was to deny Barisan Nasional two-thirds majority both in Penang and in Parliament. This softer approach compared to Kit Siang’s aggressive style in 1990, 1995, 1999 won DAP many sympathetic votes. The use of blogs as alternative media was also highly successful.

For the Chinese voters, memories don’t fade easily. Often politicians tend to think people have short memories. But the Chinese voters are still upset and aggrieved over the waving of the keris incident at UMNO Youth Assemblies and the racial rhetoric in the 2006 UMNO General Assembly. Chinese voters also perceived MCA and Gerakan to be too subservient to UMNO. For the Indian voters, HINDRAF was a key factor. The power of Makkal Sakhti (People’s Power) is real and translated into votes for the Opposition throughout the country where there are sizeable number of Indian voters. For Malay voters, Anwar provided an alternative leadership. He read the Malay mood well. To the Malay voters in Anwar’s campaign speeches, the NEP because of its over-obsession with Bumiputra equity, benefitted only UMNO Puteras and didn’t benefit the ordinary people in the rural heartland. UMNO Youth was also perceived to be brash and arrogant.

4. Looking Ahead

What the 12th General Election provided is a timely wake-up call to all political parties. They need to change, reform and deliver. For the Barisan Nasional, it means reinvention to stay relevant. For the Opposition in control of the 5 State Governments, it means the need to deliver what they promised. Can they work together? The question, looking ahead, is how UMNO will react. Will it be magnanimous and learn the right lessons? Will it change and reform from within and lower racial rhetoric to win back non-Malay support or will it up the ante to become even more ultra-Malay to retain whatever Malay support it still has? Will UMNO remain united and cohesive or will there be a scramble for positions in its coming General Assembly and party elections? The internal dynamics in UMNO in the lead up to party elections need to be watched.

For the Opposition, the key question is whether the new State Governments in Penang, Perak and Selangor can perform and deliver and meet the expectations of the people? Will there be a witch-hunt against Barisan Nasional supporters? Will they be able to cooperate and work closely together? Will they gain the support of civil servants? Will they be able to cooperate and work with the Federal Government? What will be the impact on Government-Linked Companies controlled by or connected to these state governments? For the MCA and MIC, the question is whether they should continue to narrowly fight for Chinese and Indian interests or should they reinvent themselves to become multi-racial parties like DAP and Keadilan and champion wider national issues such as corruption, human rights, judicial independence and economic opportunities.

For the Gerakan and PPP, the key question is whether they should continue to exist and if so, what is their niche in Malaysian politics? Should they bring about the merger of smaller parties in the Barisan Nasional including those in Sabah and Sarawak? Will the 2008 Election lead to the emergence of a two-party system in Malaysia? For the Prime Minister, this is an opportunity to clean house. To listen more to the voice of the people and not to be disconnected to the feelings on the ground. We have in Pak Lah a decent man, a dedicated and pious Muslim. He should use his strength to reinvent himself and renew UMNO and Barisan Nasional. Credit ought to be also given to the Prime Minister for providing more democratic space and a fairer, freer election as well as for his stoic acceptance of the democratic voice of the people, and for not reacting ala the midnite snatch in Sabah in the mid-1980’s or having an Operasi Lallang or May 13/NOC type reaction. There is clearly a need to review certain National Policies that causes unhappiness and decisiveness. Will the Barisan Nasional leadership, be able, perhaps more willing to rise to the occasion to bite the bullet?


In the final analysis, despite the massive swing to the opposition, the Barisan Nasional still remained in office at Federal level and has a comfortable majority to provide continuity and political stability. This analysis provides some key facts and pose some key questions that need to be pondered over in the days and months ahead. Whatever it is, Malaysian politics post March 8, 2008 will not be the same again. It is time for a new beginning. A new era has begun. More importantly, to note that the morning after, most surveys showed that many Malaysians from all races and different walks of life felt good over the election outcome. Dated: 13th March 2008





By Asli

BN defeat: no need for expert analysis

Why do Umno and the rest of the Barisan National component parties need to 'engage an independent body to conduct a post-mortem on their performance in the recent general election'? Were they so removed from the rakyat that they were not aware of the swelling discontentment that was swirling amongst the ordinary folk?

No wonder the political tsunami that swept across the nation with five states going to the opposition was a complete unexpected shock to Umno and the BN parties. You don’t need an expert in political science to tell you what actually caused the failure of the Barisan Nasional parties.

The principle cause of the BN failure can be attributed to the leaders in Umno. They were under the delusion that they had the majority support of the Malay populace. To a certain extent this was true before the advent of PAS and now PKR.

However failure to realise that the political landscape had changed led Umno leaders to formulate policies that antagonised the non-Malays. The non-Malays were maginalised in practically every aspect of the Umno-dominated government policies.

This marginalisation led to the loss of support for other race-based BN parties like MCA, MIC and Gerakan. In addition, the BN component parties were cowed to such an extent that religious and educational issues affecting the community did not find a voice and they were unable articulate their grievances.

Umno’s mistake was its failure to grasp the current political reality. Umno today cannot claim to be a legitimate representative of all the Malays. With the birth of PAS and now PKR, Umno at best can claim to have the support of only 30% of the Malay community.

In fact, it was reported in the main stream media that Umno's Malay support in the recent election amounted to only 29.6%. The reality of today’s political landscape clearly demonstrates that for any of the three parties - Umno, PAS and PKR - to succeed, it is vital for them to obtain the support of the non-Malays.

They were, in fact, the king-makers of the last election. As long as Malay support is divided amongst the three parties namely Umno, PAS and PKR, the fate of each of them will continue to remain in the hands of the non-Malays.

Therefore if Umno continues to plod along with its old racist and pro-Umnoputra NEP policies thinking that it will garner Malay support but in fact eroding its non-Malay support, it will most likely end up as a political dinosaur in the next general election.

Typical Malay worried about Non Malay exco's in Perak State Government

A group of Perak NGOs are concerned that the rights of the Malays in the state will be compromised in view of the racial composition of the new government’s exco line-up.

Yesterday, the 20 NGOs - led by the Young Malay Professionals (Prowaris) - stated that the 6-3-1 formula between PKR, DAP and PAS is not reflective of the state’s population.

Of the 59 state seats, DAP controls 18 while PKR has seven and PAS six, bringing the total to 31. Barisan Nasional controls the remaining 28.

Contacted today, Prowaris president Feriz Omar said the state exco must be a racial representation of the state.

With regards to the population of Malays, who form the majority in Perak, he said the state should have more Malay excos.

He also commented on the new Selangor exco line-up, saying that although Selangor has five non-Malay excos, it is still more democratic compared to Perak.

Selangor has four state excos from DAP, three from PAS and four from PKR.

Feriz, who described Prowaris as a non-partisan Malay NGO, said the organisation will support any state leader who supports the continuity of the Malay agenda irregardless of which party the leader comes from.

"Although (PKR de facto leader) Anwar (Ibrahim) has criticised the New Economic Policy (NEP), we can't deny that Anwar, in his arguments, still has some ideas and support for the Malay Agenda, indirectly,"he said.
Perak Prowaris, representing the 20 NGOs, has also submitted a memorandum to Sultan Azlan Shah of Perak to protest against the state exco's racial composition.

"We have received good support from the palace, and we will work closely with Istana Perak in the future" said. Feriz.

'There will be conflict'

Meanwhile, Perak Gabungan Pelajar Melayu Semenanjung (GPMS) president Zainal Abidin Mohd Nor said it is only appropriate that a Malay majority state be represented by Malay state excos.

"Even in the previous BN cabinet, we had three MCA representatives and one from MIC. But here in Perak, we are going to have almost seven non-Malay state excos. But then again, this is what they call democracy," he said when contacted.

Zainal Abidin added, even though the new Perak MB, Mohammad Nizar Jamaludin, is a Malay, there will be conflict in the state exco when the MB makes a decision over something that will affect the Malays.

"The majority non-Malay state excos might not agree with him (Nizar) if he wants to implement something for the Malays. They (non-Malay excos) will override his decision," he said.

However, Mohammad Nizar has dismissed this fear and pledged to continue with the 6-3-1 formula.

Samy Vellu in MIC, like a bull in China shop

MIC will work harder in order to win back the Indian community's trust’. So says the former MP from Sungai Siput. He is also quoted as saying, ‘I will now focus my energy on MIC and the problems affecting the Indians as I believe that I can still reunite the Indians. I'm sure I can do this as I know everyone. I've done this for 42 years and I know my people.’

This got me thinking about a few questions. Isn't it rather presumptuous of Samy Vellu to think he's the right person for rebuilding Indian Malaysians' trust in the MIC? Besides, what exactly does he mean that he ‘will now focus [his] energy on MIC and the problems affecting the Indians"? I though that was precisely what he was supposedly responsible for during all the years while at the helm of the MIC.

Seems to me, Samy Vellu's apparent awakening to the plight of the Indians has been much too long overdue, and quite frankly, irrelevant. I wonder just why it didn't dawn on him that there was in fact a considerable amount of work to be done to uplift those Indians for whom a generation or more of economic change, development, and opportunities have actually passed them by, and for whom the boom years of Malaysian development seemed to have been nothing more than a mirage.

Was he not, then, focusing on problems affecting then Indians? If not, what exactly was he doing all these years as the unrelenting occupant of the office of president of MIC?

Oh, and just for the record, it also warrants asking why he seems to assume that the Indians are in need of being united. Perhaps he needs to be reminded – again - that we were very united indeed when we sent a resounding message of no-confidence to the current MIC leadership. No. I for one don't see how the Indians are disunited and in need of uniting.

Quite the contrary, we have arguably never been more united than we are now! We are united in our frustration with Samy Vellu's failure as an advocate and voice for our concerns; we are united in feeling neglected and treated as second-class citizens; united in our realisation that we are consistently rendered irrelevant to the priorities of the Barisan National; united in being fed-up about repeated denial of reasonable access to public higher education; united in finding that the path to suicide for our youth is a lot more appealing than the path to hope and fulfillment of their dreams.

Need I go on?

I don't suppose the many 'yes-men' that make up his inner-circle in his MIC can really tell Samy Vellu that Indian Malaysians are united about all the aforementioned, and we, as Malaysians, are going to remain united in affirming our rights under the constitution. And I have a fairly strong feeling that he and his cadres in the MIC have seen that Indians can articulate and affirm themselves in Malaysian society even as the MIC regressed into being practically obsolete.

It appears that the post-mortem that the MIC will undertake will essentially focus more on how to bring Indian voters back into the MIC and Barisan fold, and not much else. Of course, this might take some enticing and 'greasing' of the proverbial wheel, but not much will change. Besides, I for one am convinced that to have Samy Vellu rebuild the MIC would be as constructive as letting a bull run free in a china shop. Have we not seen what his supposed leadership skills have done to the organisation?

This in turn raises a larger question: Does having an MIC really matter now and is it worth resuscitating? Of course, if the answer is in the affirmative, then it warrants considering whether Samy Vellu is indeed the appropriate person to spearhead this process. Well, I think by now you know what I think. And why should those who are committed to rebuilding the MIC want to bother with Samy Vellu?

Would he not just be more of a liability; a sore reminder of the very failure the organisation has become? Beyond being a symbolic albatross, there are other pragmatic downsides to his involvement in any rebuilding effort. There is just too much in-party political baggage, mediocrity, and invested self-interest that will taint any supposed revitalisation process. Having dominated the limelight all these years and, by extension, systematically blocking the infusion of dynamic, articulate, progressive, and new blood into the MIC fold – certainly not the kind that might be independent minded – how can he genuinely and credibly oversee the rebuilding of the MIC?

It might come as a surprise to him that a wide spectrum of Malaysians (Indians and non-Indians alike), have for a long time found the MIC to be a deep disappointment, if not an embarrassment. No sugar coating and public 'kiss-and-make up' such as between S Subramaniam and Samy Vellu will suffice in dismantling the entrenched organisational and structural problems that plague the MIC.

There are, of course, other alternatives and Indian voters have taken a significant step in experimenting with such alternative approaches. There are other real and credible advocates for social justice out there. Opposition parties and civic groups also have long been accessible to Indian Malaysians. In the political arena, Indians have now demonstrated a united (no pun intended!) front in pursuing a more credible multi-racial alternative.

Perhaps the political shift signaled by the twelfth general election will be a true awakening for the Indians (and for that matter, all Malaysians) that conscientious representatives of the people come in all colours, religions and political stripes.




G Krishnan Mar 21, 08 4:52pm

MIC abandoned......dear Subra

The abandonment of MIC by Malaysian Indians is surely a reflection that MIC has failed itself significantly in representing the very people it serves.

MIC failed the Indians, when did barely nothing to prevent the temple demolitions. MIC failed when its leaders did not ensure that budgeted allocations actually went towards needy Tamil schools. MIC failed when it's leaders did not negotiate for better salaries for Estate Workers, or find jobs for displaced Estate workers. May we ask what MIC did towards halting the rising rates of gangsterism within the Malaysian Indian community?

We did not hear a squeak from MIC leaders when time and again Indians died in police custody. Once again where was the voice of MIC leaders when our deserving students did not get placement in the Universities? Neither did we hear our MIC representatives clamour to give housing for poor urban Indians. Where were the MIC leaders when our community were deprived of jobs and when the number of Indians in Government dropped alarmingly?

Sir, sorry to say, that our MIC leaders together with the ruling Government wilfully neglected the Indian community. So now you tell us, why do we Indians need such category of self serving leaders?

Though we Malaysian Indians had MPs and other leaders in Government, rarely did anyone take up their cause, a case in point, the hundreds of Memos sent in by Hindraf went virtually ignored and unanswered by all in government. When in actual fact, the MIC should have taken onus to address the problems enumerated in the Hindraf demands, this being specific Indian issue. Instead leaders went all out to demonise us, resorting to all manner of name calling from penyangkak to extremists to murderers even to the extent of our esteemed police force's vivid and imaginary terrorist links.

Why you too Sir, did not make any efforts to take up the Indian cause, surely with your connections you could have highlighted the Indian plight, but then I guess all of you very busy pursuing your own personal and business interests. Why did you not use your influence with the Government to speak on behalf of the thousands of Indians who came out on the streets in a voice of discontent? Were you lounging in one of the hotels on Jalan Ampang watching us Malaysian Indians being jetted with chemical waters and tear gas?

Consider the 12th General Elections and see for yourself how the Indians rallied with the opposition especially in constituencies where MIC candidates were contesting. Indians tirelessly worked to ensure that MIC candidates failed to get elected. Is that not proof in itself, that the very people MIC represents, in effect ensured its failure? Otherwise how do you attribute that even the CEO of MIC and his deputy failed to get elected, it was not by coincidence but the very intention of frustrated and marginalised Malaysian Indians.

One of the main reasons for the debacle of the BN in this elections, is that the Indians previously complacent openly came out in large numbers to assist the opposition candidates, be it DAP, PAS or PKR, it did not matter to them whether the candidates were Indian, Chinese, Malay or any other, nevertheless Indians gave their whole hearted support to any candidate other than BN.

By now you should know that the reason for the component parties' devastation in the 12th GE was primarily because the minorities felt that their leaders failed to represent and voice out the discontent of the people. This in turn effected the rise of the elite UMNO and their racial policies. Just to illustrate, when the Keris was raised, those who mumbled and grumbled a bit, were seen in the next days papers, smiling and shaking hands, with the keris wielding leader who today unfortunately still sits in cabinet, while the rest of us were furious and feared our very future in this nation.

To your question on who will represent the Indians, there are enough Indians in Parliament and the State Assemblies to ensure the welfare of the Indians. Right now there is a strong Indian presence in five state governments, so to you we say we have sufficient representation of Indians in whom we have placed our trust and confidence.

For the development of respective Arts and Culture, there should not be a problem to initiate societies and associations for the promotion of language, literature, culture, arts, music and dance.

It is timely that big industrialists and entrepreneurs come forward to develop, train and mentor the younger generation. I am equally sure that you should not have a problem with your expertise and being a person of influence to establish ways to promote economic growth of marginalised and deserving Malaysians irrespective of race or religion.

To Samy Velu, who today said "who will represent the Indians"? Go and seek penance in Kasi and prepare yourself to meet your maker, your end is nearing. Be sure you have answers for your bad performance and your major role in the making of a powerful opposition, for certain, they have already thanked you for this. Meditate how your devious actions led to the sad demise of MIC. By raising the tolls, in amassing huge amounts of wealth. We ofcourse in the elections did not forget how the Hindraf assemblers were treated at Batu Caves and we gave you the answer by booting you out. Be gone. You have negated all the the efforts and the good done by the early founders of MIC, you have dragged all their work into the stinking muck.

By the way, Dato Subramaniam and others you could earn back some semblence of respect if you could get not just the Hindraf 5 but also all other ISA detainees released. However if you wish to serve,let it be all Malaysians, not just one community, that is our sincere advice to you.

We have now reached a mature stage whereby we the people, Malays, Chinese, Indians and others will directly involve ourselves with our elected representatives to ensure that all our interests are taken care of. We have made our voice heard in this elections and we say once and for all, be gone all yea who want to encourage racism and partisan politics in Malaysia, that was once and no more shall the people let self-serving politicians divide us.

Why have you not heard our loud "NO TO RACISM, NEPOTISM, WASTEFUL EXPENDITURE AND CORRUPTION.

Right now, there are stalwarts who are true patriots, working to ensure the success of the Barisan Rakyat.

Barisan Rakyat is the only way forward for Malaysia.


by Raja Petra Kamaruddin

Ten Key factors - 2008 General Election post mortem

Few expected that the wave of protest would snowball into the record losses for the Barisan National. My own analysis was the gains would be at maximum 70 seats and two state governments, not the record five state governments and 82 seats for the opposition.

While the ground swell of disgruntlement was there, concerns about electoral fairness and persistent patterns of ethnic voting dampened the optimism, even among the opposition. Yet, the record breaking losses for the BN have created a fundamental rupture in Malaysian politics.

Based on following the campaign and the generosity of ordinary people and political elites sharing their views, here are my top 10 reasons for the outcome:

1. Reformasi spirit lives on
The BN severely miscalculated in its assessment of the Malaysian electorate. In 2004, Prime Minister Abdullah Ahmad Badawi embraced the reform agenda that catapulted into the electoral agenda in the 1999 election.The fight against corruption, increased transparency, and, most important, better governance underscored his 2004 campaign. Recall the advertisements for a more effective civil service, and the focus on building on his ‘Mr Clean’ persona.Coupled with Abdullah's affable personal style and the groundswell of goodwill, Malaysians embraced his leadership, giving him then a record mandate. But the mandate was not just about Abdullah the man, it was also about the issues that he used to get himself and the BN elected.The 2004 campaign was filled with promises of reform of the police to address crime and pledges to reduce corruption. Not only were these promises not fulfilled, the problems have been seen to deepen during his tenure as reform efforts were abandoned and anti-corruption efforts were selectively applied.Many in the 2008 BN slate continued to have questions about alleged corruption, from S Samy Vellu (Maika scandal) to others close to the prime minister. These charges were not investigated, and in fact with the continued selection of candidates this round with corruption clouds, the Abdullah administration failed to show a commitment to address the problems it acknowledged in 2004.At the core, Malaysians want - and deserve - a better government. The spirit of reform remained alive and kicked back in this election.

2. Abdullah's laissez-faire lackluster leadership
Abdullah brought about a profound transformation in liberalising the political system, allowing more voices to be heard, and graciously accepting the electoral results. In these areas, he deserves high praise.Yet, he failed in the key area that has been the backbone of the BN's legitimacy - economic performance. The macro numbers in Malaysia are strong and the country remains one of the most competitive for investment regionally. Yet, it is falling behind in maintaining competitiveness and the economic gains are not being effectively distributed to the population.Abdullah's administration corresponded to high inflation - the highest since the early 70s. Inequality is rising sharply and ordinary people, notably the middle-class based in the urban areas, are feeling the pinch. Even though commodity prices have brought more wealth to the rural areas, it is not keeping up with rising costs. This was brought home to me with conversations with Malay rubber tappers in Larut, Perak, who supported PAS in record numbers.In fairness, the rising prices are the result of an appreciating ringgit, rising oil prices and high government subsidies, issues that are either out of Abdullah's control or he inherited. Yet, his economic team proved not able to manage domestic prices effectively and translate the oil and gas revenue into gains for society at large that could be felt in ordinary households.The recent Hari Raya, Chinese New Year and Deepavali holidays were noticeably less plush than before, a real sign of fiscal difficulties. Wages have comparatively dropped and those working in the service sector make barely enough to survive. The starting take-home salary at 7-Eleven is RM700 a month. Unemployment among younger people remains too high, and not all of them can be absorbed into the civil service.Difficult conditions are compared sharply to the wealth of the political elite, including Abdullah and his family with a reported new home in Perth. The conspicuous display of consumption of the elite is on display from the rural areas of Perak to the Kuala Lumpur shopping malls.Beyond the bread-and-butter issues, was a more serious dynamic - the inability to instill confidence in promoting long-term economic development, increasing Malaysia's economic competitiveness. The economic vision was missing in Abdullah's first term, and the fiscal liquidity in the country was not adequately invested locally.The economic reforms needed to bring about the changes were not pursued with the zeal to keep Malaysia ahead of countries like Vietnam. In particular, Malaysia faces the difficult task of making is domestic business entrepreneurs more competitive. This involves weaning them off a dependence on contracts. This is true for both the Malay and Chinese business communities alike.Abdullah's administration strengthened its use of patronage, and did not send a clear message to end wasteful big projects. The new economic corridors have yet to be shown to be effective allocations of resources, rather than avenues for elite economic gain. Malaysia did not aggressively pursue trade liberalisation in a means to attract more foreign capital.Moreover, the much-needed reforms in education, to strengthen Malaysia's human capital, were not effectively implemented, although good ideas were touted. Investors want confidence, and effective policy implementation.Abdullah's decision-making style has yet to yield the results his 2004 mandate should have given him. The ideas were developed, but not implemented. The talent in Malaysia is there, but Abdullah was not able to effectively harness it. The BN is fooling itself if it thinks the electorate does not appreciate the larger issues that affect their children's futures.

3. BN coalition failings and infighting
Abdullah's poor management extended to the BN itself. The component parties within the BN were dismissed and ignored. Whether this involved the PGCC (Penang Global City Centre) project in Penang in which the opposition of Gerakan to the project was completely by-passed or the memorandum on Article 11 that the parties were forced to withdraw, the perception was created that voices for non-Malays in the coalition were not being heard.Umno came across as too arrogant within the coalition. This came to a head in the Hindraf affair, when voices within the system rejected the concerns of ordinary voices and added salt to the wound by arresting the Indian Malaysian leaders. This seriously delegitimised the MIC as the voice of the Indian Malaysian community. It is not a coincidence that Devamany S Krishasamy, the MP from Cameron Highlands, who had the bravery to at least acknowledge concerns, was reelected and Samy Vellu, who justified the arrests, lost.The issue of problematic BN management extended to the dominant party within the BN itself, Umno. Abdullah came into office without a strong political base within his party. The party rallied around him in the office of the PM, yet he continued to face dissension inside. Rumours of rifts between him and his deputy Najib Razak continued, and were denied as in fact their working relationship was overall sound in the first term.Yet, the dissension continued to percolate, with former premier Dr Mahathir Mahathir leading the charge. The March polls were not just about national elections, they were also about positioning for the next Umno elections. In this regard, the March polls were used as a means to strengthen Abdullah and his allies positions within the party.Mentri besars were given much more influence over the candidate slates. Popular candidates, those that hold important division chief positions within Umno, were dropped. It is no wonder the Umno machinery did not work as effectively in this election compared to the last. As one Umno elite described it, there were too many "fronts" opened this campaign to mend. The impact of Umno infighting is most obvious historically in Kelantan, but can account for losses elsewhere and reduced majorities even in safe areas such as Perlis.The divisions within Umno were paralleled by splits within the other important component parties. For the MCA, the battle over leadership was already on the agenda before the election and the ouster of Chua Soi Lek, distancing of Chan Kong Choy and rise of Ong Ka Chuan, the brother of the party’s president have created serious ripples within the party.The MCA knew defeat was coming, but not as serious as the outcome. They slated the least number of incumbents - 35% - due to infighting and the difficult Chinese electoral terrain. The MCA's loss in the urban areas shows that they lost both Chinese and English-educated Chinese, the latter of which have not been effectively included in Ong Ka Ting's tenure.The MIC's crisis is well-known, as a similar dynamic over succession permeated the election, and the record number of new candidates for the MIC only served to have MIC fight itself in places like Perai in Penang. Gerakan's internal difficulties in the chief ministership issue were also on public display, although for the purposes of the election, the party maintained unity - to no avail.

4. Better messaging by the opposition
It is thus not surprising that the BN campaign lacked a coherence. In reading the messages about its record, the issues raised were disparate and lacked focus. While clearly polished posters and top printing quality, the BN content did not resonate clearly. The messages used in different states did not fit clearly under one umbrella, such as Umno's focus on it being the party of the struggle for Islam in Terengganu and Kelantan.In fact, many of the messages belied the experience of ordinary Malaysians - end of poverty? clean police force? prices least in the region? The connection to society was missing. The tone of the campaign was one in which the voices of society were not listened to, and people were talked down to.Many pointed to the arrogance of the BN in its campaign - highlighting the ‘One Choice’ poster as a fundamental lack of appreciation that there was another choice in this campaign, a choice that the majority of the electorate chose. The defensive posture of the BN campaign failed to offer hope to the electorate. "Be grateful for what you have" does not evoke support in a context of increased economic difficulties.In comparison, the opposition was united in promoting one message of "change". While they differed in their priorities of what they wanted to change, they all concurred on introducing more checks and balances in the system. Each party had a common template and umbrella that allowed candidates that were unknown to build on the individual party's identity.The message was modest in goals and a positive message. This more effective messaging allowed the opposition to reach out to new voters, and convinced many Malaysians to vote outside of ethnic lines.

5. Embracing modern campaigning: New mediums
A critical component of the opposition's stronger campaign was its more aggressive move to modern campaign techniques. While Malaysia elections continue to be labour intensive affairs, with house-to-house campaigning the norm, the use of polling of the electorate and the embrace of the Internet, blogs and SMS worked more the advantage for the opposition.The opposition was denied balanced coverage in the mainstream media, and thus was forced to adopt new campaign techniques for greater penetration of their message. PAS was perhaps the most effective of all the opposition parties in using its website to reach out to its supporters, with its candidates profiled early on. Yet, PKR and DAP were also close behind, using email list-serves and YouTube. The uploading of ceramah allowed a wider audience to hear their message. The BN lacked the same level of adoption of these techniques. In part, it believed that control over the media and resources would work. This is understandable. They have worked in the past. Yet, Malaysia is no longer the same place. Now 42 percent of Malaysians reportedly use the Internet, and they have access to alternative opinions.No matter what level of control over blogging the government introduces, they cannot control cyberspace. The BN will need to adjust its campaigning methods to reach out effectively, especially to younger voters.

6. Timing of election and campaign period
The long campaign worked in favour of the opposition, not the government. This has to do in part with the cheaper means to conduct campaigns noted above - CD's, Internet and SMS are cheaper than paying campaign workers.Yet the longer campaign period - the longest since 1969 - allowed the opposition to get its message out, to respond to the issues that the BN were raising. Instead of a blast in which the focus was on a few key messages, candidates from all parties had to adapt and change their messages as the campaign evolved.This was most evident in Penang, where the response of outgoing chief minister Dr Koh Tsu Koon to the issue of the state's future leadership, provided fodder to the opposition during the campaign itself. The BN proved less willing to adapt as the campaign evolved. Thirteen is clearly not Abdullah's lucky number. This election was called too early. While there is no doubt that economic pressures would have made the context difficult, the possible international recession might have given Abdullah more ability to deflect blame. As is, he alone was faced with an assessment of his economic management.The scheduling of the elections only a few months after Hindraf and during the Chinese New Year celebrations did not help build confidence among non-Malays. Rushing the seat allocation within the coalition contributed to internal BN disgruntlement. More policies should have been implemented to address ethnic relations and more efforts to address the infighting within the coalition needed to be done before the election. The election was clearly poorly timed.

7. Opposition cooperation
The opposition is comprised of three different political parties with different political outlooks and philosophies. It is also comprised of strong personalities. After the DAP left the Barisan Alternatif in 2001, the divide between the opposition parties widened, as the ideological differences over Islamic governance split the DAP and PAS, and even had ripple effects within PKR.Bringing the opposition together into the non-aggression pact of this election and the common umbrella was a massive effort, led by members within all the parties who recognised that national gains were not possible without cooperation.All the parties needed cooperation to win new ground - DAP in Penang, PAS in Kedah and all the parties in Selangor and Perak. The seat negotiations were heated and difficult, but in West Malaysia successful. All the party leaders are responsible for this success. It involved moving PAS away from an openly Islamist agenda, which it adopted in the 2004 campaign, and all the parties to embrace multiracialism.Operationally, cooperation involved joint PKR-DAP and PKR-PAS ceramah and on the ground canvassing, in which PKR and Anwar Ibrahim in particular brought parties together. For the campaign, the common goal of breaking two-thirds majority blinded the opposition to the ideological differences within itself and instilled more party discipline in all the parties.Electorally, the opposition was seen as a viable alternative as the opposition, not individual parties.

8. Strong opposition candidates
The opposition also slated strong articulate candidates who spoke about the issues. From Nurul Izzah Anwar's discussion of housing, Nik Nazmi Nik Ahmad's attention to education and Liew Chin Tong's focus on the chief ministership issue to Dr Syed Azman Syed Ahmad Nawawi's highlight of the royalty disbursement in Terengganu, the candidates in the opposition spoke concretely about concerns in their constituencies.The opposition is now comprised of a greater number of professionals - up to over 45% - and now includes businessmen such as incoming PKR MB of Selangor Khalid Ibrahim as well as social activists such as Dr Lee Boon Chye in Perak. Those that have stayed in the opposition and joined the parties after the heyday of 1999 are deeply committed to the principles the opposition calls for. While lacking in governing experience, there is talent and many who listened to the ceramah recognised this.This is not to say that the BN did not slate capable candidates. The share of professionals remained high - over 30% - and the parties have extraordinarily capable people. Yet, the few that are tainted by scandals spoil the chances for others. Clean politicians within the BN - and there are many hardworking representatives within the BN - are negatively affected by the image that BN governance is about gaining wealth, not public service.This time round, even the hardest working parliamentarians such as Chew Mei Fun, could not meet the challenge of the younger dynamic slate for change.

9. Backfire from attack on Anwar Ibrahim
If there was one serious miscalculation that took place during the campaign, it was the attack on Anwar Ibrahim. Personal in nature, it was seen as unfair, especially in the Malay community.No question, there are real concerns among many Malaysians about Anwar Ibrahim's tenure in government - from issues of education to Islamic governance. He will have to continue to build confidence in the Malaysian electorate to those who have reservations about this leadership in the opposition.Yet, the attack on Anwar provoked a reaction, particularly among Malays. It reignited the 1999 reformasi spirit, and only served to add credibility to his influence nationally. Here, the BN served to alienate many Malays through negative campaigning, rather than convince the electorate to support its message of development.

10. Sophistication of Malaysian electorate
Finally, and it is finally (with apologies for the length of this article), the 2008 election illustrated the strengthening of Malaysian identity and growing sophistication of the electorate.Gone are the days when resources and promises alone can woo support - except perhaps in East Malaysia. Malaysians want more responsiveness and voices, and they used this campaign to stand in the majority for change. They no longer can be talked down to, but need to be listened and heard, not just during the election.The leadership in both the opposition and the BN will have to keep this in mind, as the terrain has fundamentally changed.