Malaysia after regime change - PAS and Islam

As Malaysia prepares for its 13^th general elections, due no later than April 2013, the long-standing competitive authoritarian regime will face one of its most difficult tests. The 2008 elections dealt a surprise blow to the incumbent Barisan Nasional (BN), and ever since, Prime Minister Najib’s government has struggled to protect its now-fragile majority. After four years of renewed opposition activism, rumours of defection from UMNO (the United Malays National Organisation), and the recent acquittal of opposition leader Anwar Ibrahim, Malaysians will have the chance to vote the BN out of office once and for all.
In a post-BN Malaysia, observers will closely monitor the role of Islam in public life. Much of what happens will depend on the shape of the government that follows. In terms of the composition of a post-BN government, two outcomes seem most likely: (1) a multi-ethnic Pakatan Rakyat-based (PR) coalition in which PAS (Parti Islam SeMalaysia/Pan Malaysian Islamic Party), PKR (Parti Keadilan Rakyat/People’s Justice Party), and the DAP (Democratic Action Party) all participate, perhaps along with one or more East Malaysian parties; or (2) an UMNO-PAS “Muslim-Malay” coalition, again perhaps involving the cooperation of one or more East Malaysian parties. Either way, PAS—an explicitly Islamic party—will be part of the government.

That PAS would advocate for a greater role for Islam in Malaysian public life is undeniable. PAS describes its goals as follows:

• Memperjuangkan wujudnya di dalam negara ini sebuah masyarakat dan pemerintahan yang terlaksana di dalamnya nilai-nilai hidup Islam dan hukum-hukumnya menuju keredhaan Allah. [Fighting to create a society and government that is run according to Islamic principles and the laws which please Allah]
• Mempertahankan Kesucian Islam serta kemerdekaan dan kedaulatan negara. [Defending the sanctity of Islam alongside independence and national sovereignty.]

The prospect of PAS in government alone is worrying for those many Malaysians (both Muslims and non-Muslims) who express concern about the Islamisation of Malaysian politics and society. Moreover, a PR-based government would struggle to balance PAS’s goals with the DAP’s largely non-Muslim constituency. That would make an UMNO-PAS alliance all the more attractive to PAS, while UMNO, whose membership is not restricted to Muslims but is overwhelming Muslim anyway, would likely not hesitate to return to power with a new coalition partner.

Questions about PAS after the BN may reflect the concerns that many non-Muslims in Malaysiahave about the role of religion in public life, and Malaysia’s Hindu minority in particular has cause for grievance on this account. But this obscures the corrosive effects that six decades of ethnic partisanship have had on the prospects for Malaysian democracy. It is a mistake, in other words, to focus narrowly on PAS, or broadly on Islam itself, when anticipating Islam in a post-BN Malaysian political order. Doing so confuses the potential consequences of PAS in government with the factors that have contributed both to PAS’s popularity and to the current state of Islam in Malaysian public life.

PAS itself has not played a major role in the Islamisation of Malaysian politics or Malaysian society. Rather, it was Malay politicians in the pre-independence period (the very same group that went on to found UMNO) who enshrined Islam in the constitution and legally defined Malay-ness with reference to Islam. This was done not in the name of Islam, but to protect what were perceived to be “Malay interests” (see for example A History of Malaysia, pp. 256-257). After independence, with communism illegal, social democracy discredited (through its historical affiliation with a largely Chinese opposition party), liberalism cast as antithetical to Malaysian values, multiculturalism or pan-ethnic solidarity discouraged through the party system, and the bumi/non-bumi split underlying every aspect of social and economic policy, the only “Malay” alternative to UMNO’s Malay platform was PAS’s Islamist platform.

Today, in a society in which economic function and demographic characteristics such as urbanisation no longer distinguish Malays from non-Malays as easily as they once did, core issues such as religion have a new importance for voters whose political identities are constructed through an ethnic framework.

The strategic logic of political competition in Malaysia’s plural society therefore rewards parties seeking Malay votes when they appeal to the characteristics that define Malays in opposition to non-Malays. It should not surprise anyone that when Malay voters find UMNO politicians wanting, they are likely to vote for the only opposition party whose political outlook has not been labelled as “un-Malaysian” for the past half century.

Facing this, non-exclusivist opposition parties such as the DAP and PKR have struggled to transcend the ethnic paradigm in Malaysian politics. The choice for non-Malay, non-Muslim voters has been whether to cast their lot with their own regime-allied (and ethnically-constituted) parties, the “un-Malaysian” multiethnic opposition, or the Islamist PAS.
The fundamental challenge for public life in a post-BN Malaysia is not Islam, it is ethnicity’s dominant role in defining Malaysians’ political identity, and this challenge is just as pressing today as it would be if a new government with PAS comes to power following the upcoming elections. Of course, PAS’s explicitly religious goals are important to note, but there are few things that it could do in government that are not already within UMNO’s capacity today.

UMNO has presided over—and its campaign messages and public policies have encouraged—the rise of Islam in public life. It is tempting today to see what Judith Nagata called the “reflowering of Malaysian Islam” as merely a local instance of a global Muslim awakening, but this misses the very politics of Islamic politics in Malaysia.

In the Malaysian context, the rise of religion is the unavoidable consequence of the politicisation of ethnicity. A PAS-led government might go further than the BN has in prosecuting perceived insults to Islam, or in expanding the domain of Islamic family law, but such worries already mark Malaysian public life. The religious issues facing Malaysia are far deeper than the ruling party’s religious outlook, and having PAS in government is best understood as the outcome of decades of social change and religious conflict rather than a possible independent cause of future religious tensions.

It is reasonable to wonder what Malaysian politics would look like with an avowedly Islamist party like PAS in government, but as always, the meaning of Islam in Malaysian public life cannot be separated from the dominance of ethnicity in Malaysian politics.

The “solution” to the “problem” of Islam in Malaysian politics—if one believes that Islam is indeed a problem—is the same as the solution to many of the other issues that face contemporary Malaysian society: a post-ethnic movement (not merely a multi-ethnic one) in which Malaysians identify, assemble, and act as Malaysians rather than as representatives of ethnic groups in a zero-sum competition for power and resources.
This is what many hope that a PR government would mean, and in rhetorical terms, that is what Najib’s 1Malaysia campaign promises. A recent article in the Economist suggests that many young Malaysians would welcome such a post-ethnic politics. But they will have to wait, for Malaysian politics as BN-versus-PR restates the ethnic politics framework without moving past it.







Thomas Pepinsky is assistant professor of government at Cornell University, Ithaca, NY,USA. His work focuses on comparative politics and international political economy, with a special focus on contemporary issues in island Southeast Asia. His interests include the politics of finance, authoritarianism, Islam, and finding a way to move Ithaca to the tropics.

Malaysia after regime change - With or Without Barisan Nasional: Regime Change and Identity Politics in Post Authoritarian Malaysia

Why are you interested in Malaysia? If asked such a question, the majority of foreign observers, scholars and students of Malaysian politics would most likely mention ethnicity, religion (Islam) or what is broadly categorised as “identity politics.” Even if identity is not their primary interest, not one of them is likely to deny that collective identities are a crucial aspect of contemporary Malaysian politics dominated by the multi-ethnic ruling coalition, National Front (Barisan Nasional, BN).

What will Malaysian politics look like if BN ever lost power? Would identity, either ethnic or religious, recede from politics if the opposition, People’s Alliance (Pakatan Rakyat, PR), came to power? Or would it fuel politicisation of identity even further to threaten otherwise relatively oppressive but peaceful inter-communal relations?

Possible answers to these questions in part depend on the type of regime that the opposition coalition—comprised of the People’s Justice Party (PKR), Democratic Action Party (DAP), and the Islamic Party of Malaysia (PAS)—wishes to establish. The opposition pact was first and foremost formed and sustained to challenge and bring down the authoritarian rule of BN where the Malay-Muslim based United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) is dominant. The establishment of some form of democratic rule is their next goal. Indeed, their platform, “Ubah Sekarang, Selamatkan Malaysia! (Change Now, Save Malaysia!)”, published in the run-up to the 2008 elections emphasizes the following initiatives: expansion of democratic rights and institutions such as independent judiciary; creation of a just and fair society that provides all people with equal opportunities regardless of ethnicity, religion and culture; elimination of corruption and other unfair and discriminatory practices that hinder equal and fair distribution of public resources; growth with equity; and elimination of undemocratic apparatuses and practices, most notably the Internal Security Act (ISA). The absence of aforementioned initiatives under the current regime provided a common ground for opposition parties to come and fight together, leading to their impressive electoral ascendancy in 2008. The question remains however: Is the PR platform sufficient to convince their multi-ethnic constituencies to oust BN from power to build a new democratic Malaysia?

Complication about Malaysia’s regime change and democratic transition is derived from the very nature of the current regime. It is not only authoritarian in a conventional sense of the term, but also highly ethnocentric and illiberal, thereby denying equal rights and freedom to minority citizens based on their ethnic/religious identities. Under this regime, the majority Malay (and therefore Muslim) population have gained an unparalleled amount of power, wealth, status and opportunities as their birth rights since independence. UMNO and its major coalition partners in BN, the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA) and the Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC), were formed and allowed to survive primarily to represent and protect political and material interests of Chinese and Indian minority communities. In the post-NEP period, the regime has become even more protective of the communal interests of the Muslim-Malays while gaining authoritarian characters.

Under this ethnocentric pro-Malay regime, state institutions and a bureaucratic infrastructure were constructed in a manner to buttress supremacy of the state, UMNO and the Muslim-Malay community, while undermining civil society, civil rights and the well being of minority communities. Furthermore, the same regime has granted an unprecedented amount of power, resources and authority to the Islamic state bureaucracies in order to cater to the religious interests and spiritual well being of a growingly pious Muslim-Malay community. The results of such maneuvering are now obvious in a wide range of policy areas including law, education, welfare and economy. Consequently, post-NEP generations of minority populations feel increasingly alienated and discriminated against despite the fact that some communal grievances were mitigated by the inclusive multi-ethnic national vision and continuous growth under Mahathir (together with currently opposition leader, Anwar Ibrahim) till the multiple crises following 1998.

Against this backdrop, it is of little surprise that the Hindu-Indian community has formed a powerful opposition against the regime. In 2007, the opposition was organised to form an ethno-nationalistic movement, Hindraf (Hindu Rights Action Force), to express the socio-economic grievances and political demands of the community. The state’s violent suppression of a street protest organised by the movement further deteriorated the already uneasy relations between the BN regime and minority communities, arousing anti-regime sentiments even further with particular damage done in urban areas.

Opposition parties, while certainly sharing such unusually strong anti-regime sentiments emanating from civil society, were not able to translate these divisive ethnocentric sentiments and demands directly into political action. Instead, they have chosen to stay mute on fundamental issues that they do not wish to discuss or negotiate, that is, issues related to communal identities and religion. Moreover, they strategically framed their anti-regime cause in universal democratic terms so as to forge a critical coalition with civil society forces across communal boundaries. They did so precisely because they need one another to maintain a multi-ethnic coalition front in order to beat BN. They and electorates are aware that the opposition parties and their interests, just like their opponents in the ruling coalition, are defined and restrained by competing identities: PKR is Malay-Muslim dominant and led by the most charismatic and powerful Malaysian Muslim leader to date, Anwar Ibrahim; DAP is non-Muslim based and dominated by ethnic Chinese; and PAS is a puritanical Islamist party. These constituencies have made significant efforts to compromise on issues regarding their core identities and interests in order to achieve their political goals and survival. Such compromise was handsomely rewarded with a significant 2008 increase in votes for the PR.

The tragedy of Malaysian authoritarianism is that authoritarian rule has grown stronger alongside the growing dominance of UMNO in BN and the Malaysian polity as well as its avidly pro-Malay and pro-Islam characters throughout 1980s and 1990s. The highly politicised identities—and state, political, economic and socio-cultural institutions created to serve the identity-based interests over several decades—will not easily go away even if regime change rids Malaysia of authoritarian rule and the BN falls from power. Popular interests and demands will continue to be defined and organised through collective identities based on ethnicity, religion, culture, or some combination of these characteristics.

This situation will lead to another tragedy: a tragedy of Malaysian democracy and regime change. As a result of the institutionalisation of politicised identities, demands for democracy, freedom and equal rights for all Malaysians are readily interpreted in zero-sum terms to connote a reduction of the special rights and privileges preserved for the Malay-Muslim majority. Regardless of whoever takes over the BN, the new regime will have to negotiate and balance contending communal demands and interests.

The key question here is whether Malaysians, especially the Malay-Muslim community, are ready to accept a new set of deals, terms and conditions set by the new democratic regime along the line suggested by PR. All possible signs thus far seem to suggest that they are not. According to public surveys conducted by the Merdeka Center between 2008 and 2010, a large majority of Malays, especially those in the lower income categories, strongly favour the reservation of special rights and privileges. They are also extremely anxious about policies and concessions that appear favourable to non-Malay communities. It is important to remember that Malay votes for UMNO/BN were constant between 2004 and 2008 and many still think that UMNO supremacy is necessary to protect their special rights.

More alarmingly, such anxiety among a community perceived to be under threat or siege at a time when the regime is undergoing unpredictable transition is a ready recipe for communal tension and potential violence. Indeed, it was when the BN adopted policies and allocated resources in ways seen disproportionately favorable to the non-Malay communities, especially Chinese, that ultra-nationalistic Malay movements such as Perkasa gained popular approval and appeal. Some UMNO elites were willing to allow these movements to exploit racist rhetoric and symbols in an effort to provoke anti-minority sentiment and violence.

Regime transition means that UMNO will be in the opposition. It is not unlikely that UMNO elites will use such racist rhetoric and movements more freely and aggressively to regain power they have lost, deteriorating already uneasy ethnic relations even further. We are also unsure if PAS will remain moderate once it gains power in order to have access to the conservative religious bureaucracies and patronage that have expanded dramatically under UMNO. According to Ashutosh Varshney, a renowned scholar of ethnic violence, ethnic peace is more likely when rivaling communities have developed associational interactions and ties—and social capital—across ethnic boundaries so as to withstand attempts to instigate racial hatred or antagonism. If this proposition and legacies of institutionalized political identities mentioned above offer some guide to predict Malaysia’s democratic future, we are left uncertain whether the much-waited transition to democracy will in fact bring a peaceful and happy future for all Malaysians as many had wished.

Kikue Hamayotsu is Assistant Professor at the Department of Political Science, Northern Illinois University, DeKalb, IL, USA. Her research focuses on comparative politics, identity politics, religion and politics and regime transition and quality of democracy in the Muslim world with special reference to Indonesia and Malaysia. Her current interest include: religious parties and electoral politics, religious intolerance and violence, and finding a way to move Australia closer to North America.