A new coalition politics? Harapan gov’t one month on....

June 9 marked one month after the historic GE14. It is early days yet for the new Pakatan Harapan government with only a core minimalist cabinet in place. Yet, in the past month, there have been important messages that illustrate a commitment to a genuinely different form of governance.

At the same time, the cautious and more constrained manner Prime Minister Dr Mahathir Mohamad has gone about making important decisions showcases the different style of coalition politics that now operates in an arguably more challenging political environment than that faced by BN in the past.

Despite serious obstacles, Malaysia is embracing a ‘new politics’.

Meeting promises

To date, Harapan can point to four important areas where it has fulfilled its campaign promises.

The first is the zero rating for the GST, reducing the tax burden of ordinary Malaysians. This is the first step needed to remove the tax altogether when Parliament meets in July. This policy change has been carried out with minimal impact on financial markets, thanks in part to higher oil prices and an open recognition of the need for alternative revenue sources.

Second is securing the release and pardon of Harapan de facto leader Anwar Ibrahim. This took place in record time. While one might interpret the speed of the release on the part of authorities as an effort to fuel division and competition within Harapan, this move on the part of Mahathir showed a strong commitment to reform and the partnership within Harapan itself.

Third is the increased transparency of the new government, with many ministers regularly meeting the press and engaging the public and stakeholders. This has indicated greater responsiveness and accountability on the part of the new government from the starting gate. It is especially promising given the inward orientation for fact-finding and learning that is going on.

The greater transparency has revealed some of the problems the government has inherited and can be seen as a needed corrective action to reduce expectations. Key will be whether this pattern of engagement is maintained and how the government offers solutions to the exposed problems.

Fourth are the measures introduced to tackle corruption and abuse of power of the past. From the new attorney-general and police raids to the questioning sessions of a more active MACC, these measures highlight a commitment to dealing with the excesses of the previous government.



Malaysians are awaiting the arrest of Najib Razak and his wife, as revelations post GE14 a.k.a. Pavilion Residences have shown even more abuse to ordinary Malaysians than had been believed before the election. Sadly, more is likely to come as the investigations appear to show that the former prime minister betrayed not only his country but his own party as well.

Making appeals

Harapan has combined these actions by building on four important political narratives.

The first is the continued use of nationalism post-election, as the government has appealed to national pride and reached out directly to citizens. The most obvious example of this is the creation of the Tabung Harapan Malaysia – the crowd-funded initiative to address the public debt. It has reached over RM50 million in less than two weeks. This has tapped into the deep patriotism of Malaysians and has reinforced the view that the government is addressing the serious problems it inherited from the previous government.

A second important narrative is that of inclusiveness. Harapan has repeatedly sent the message that it is a ‘Malaysian’ government. From remarks about a minister’s ethnic identity to the appointments across races, Harapan has aimed for greater representation. This has extended to the inclusion of perceived Islamists within the government in key appointments in education.

There have simultaneously been repeated reassurances that Malay interests will be protected as the aim appears to move the discussion away from division and displacement. Many are awaiting the further 15 cabinet appointments, in particular with regard to East Malaysia, which to date has not adequately been included in the national government, especially given its numerical importance in the composition of the Harapan government.

Building on the anti-corruption measures noted above, Harapan has repeatedly emphasised that it will operate with the rule of law. The perceived lawlessness of the previous government and the arbitrariness of decisions of the past make this a stark difference in governance. It is not easy to change practices and norms, but proper processes and procedures have been given more of a place. The rule of law is now moving away from the practice of using the law to rule.

Perhaps the least touted narrative pre-GE14 is the introduction of greater austerity. Mahathir appears to be introducing more fiscally prudent practices, whether it in salaries or in international trips. This is in keeping with the revelations of serious and significant government debts, but also suggests a more measured approach to governance. There has been less patronage distributed through the use of positions so far.

The message has been sent that the cuts in spending are necessary, not to cover up for lavish spending and scandals such as 1MDB but to address them.

Resistance and resignations

Collectively, these changes in governance speak to a different form of governance. Public expectations remain high and vary sharply, with many of these expectations in contradiction to one another. Choices and priorities are being contested, with some understandably expressing dissatisfaction with the pace of change.

Unlike the BN government, Harapan is operating in an environment where it does not control the mainstream media outlets. It has yet to have a clear media strategy to deliver its messages, opting for less centralisation than the past and more diversity. It has inherited a climate of considerable political polarisation and routinised practices of disinformation.

Harapan also is facing considerable resistance inside, from elites who oppose appointees to more entrenched conservative forces in the system. While it is important to acknowledge considerable goodwill in the public at large, many are suspicious and some are outright hostile and defiant inside the system as they protect their own interests and welfare. Given that this norm of self-interest has been deeply socialised, it is hard to change attitudes overnight.

Many uncooperative senior officials will need to go, with the resignations to date only the tip of what is likely needed. A key challenge will involve winning needed allies and implementing policies, given that the previous government relied on consultants to a greater extent than the civil service. This will require wisdom and balance. The choices of bringing back those with experience in government, such as the former auditor-general, speaks to a recognition of the urgency of gaining control of government inside the government itself.

Some of the resistance is coming from rivalries within the Harapan coalition itself, as the differences over reform, personal positioning and policy priorities have stymied cooperation and slowed decisions. On the whole, these conflicts have been kept out of the public limelight, given the public pressure on Harapan to meet the expectations of its supporters and fulfil the responsibility it has been given.

The realities of Malaysia’s new politics are coalition politics never seen before. This model is based on equality, mutual respect and mutual dependence. This political model will continually need compromise and confidence in each other, not always viable given political histories.

Addressing trust deficits

Building trust is not easy. The trust deficit for the new government is on multiple fronts. It is with the general public socialised in suspicion of government and with half of the population that did not vote for Harapan are watching it carefully. It also extends to the coalition actors themselves within Harapan that are finding their way to work together.

Given the ideological and personality differences within the Harapan government, the outcomes and common narratives so far show that, even with rivalries and uncertainties, the coalition is coming together and a new form of coalition politics is emerging.








Taken from malaysiakini.com

Malaysia’s political transformation(s): Preliminary reflections

Labels abound to describe what is happening to Malaysian politics since the 9 May 14th General Election (GE14), ranging from “democratic transition” to more ambiguous “change”. Equally varied are the prospects for the country, with scholars touting greater “democracy” and others pessimistically highlighting a return to the worst of the Mahathir Mohamad years, run by a “motley crew” with less-than-favourable assessments of Mahathir and/or Anwar Ibrahim based on views of their pasts.

The tumultuous political events call out for explanation and analysis. Rather than embedding analyses with superlatives or pejoratives, the focus of this piece is to disaggregate the interrelated developments occurring and to point to the factors that are shaping their outcomes. At this juncture, given the uncertainties surrounding Malaysia’s political future, it is important to lay out the factors and conditions that are shaping political trajectories. It is also important to acknowledge that the scope of issues involved indicate significant political changes ahead.

There are five different important interrelated developments happening in Malaysia.

1. Malaysia’s GE14 Election

The 9 May results calls out for explanation, given the large electoral swings, victory for Pakatan Harapan (PH or Harapan) and devastating defeat for the Barisan Nasional (BN), especially for PM Najib Razak and his party, the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO).

To date, there are three different frameworks to understand the results.

The first focuses on agency, namely the role of leaders in shaping the outcome. Here attention focuses on the liabilities caused by Najib (and his wife Rosmah Mansor), the “game changer” role of Mahathir and the foundational role of Anwar in shaping the reform movement and opposition.

The second highlights more structural socio-political forces. These include the centrality of nationalism in the election, deterioration of political institutions within the BN, notably UMNO, the expansion of the reform movement through organisations such as Bersih, the reconfiguration of the former political opposition (Harapan) through learning and compromise, the impact of taxation and economic conditions of inequality and precarity, as well as effects of globalisation and contraction of social mobility.

The third frame concentrates on the dynamics in the campaign—the interaction of factors that created the momentum of the “perfect” political storm of 9 May. Here we witnessed the use of emotion, the control of political narratives, viral use of WhatsApp by ordinary citizens, and strategic entry into the campaign of former civil servants, which served to inspire defections of UMNO loyalists and the showcase of the ineffectiveness of the BN’s electoral tactics. Campaign developments also highlight the limits of polling to predict results, and the central role that the behaviour of ordinary citizens had in determining the outcome.

These frameworks speak to how differently Malaysian elections are understood and point to varied assumptions about future trends—whether it involves the behaviour of leaders, socio-political conditions, or public narratives.

As analyses continue, there are likely to be further expansion of these frames and intensive debate on the causes of the electoral outcome(s). Key to this will be more in-depth analysis of the results themselves. My own preliminary analysis shows, for example, considerable erosion of support within the UMNO grassroots (with movement to both Pakatan Harapan and PAS, Malaysia’s Islamic party), as well as the critical role of swings in Sabah and Sarawak in the final outcomes—highlighting the need to look at UMNO and campaign dynamics in East Malaysia. This is likely to be one part of a more complex picture.

2. Malaysia’s Electoral Turnover

The day after the election was arguably one of the most important in the country’s history, when a turnover of government occurred after nearly 61 years. The immediate post-election period is less known, as much of the developments happened behind closed doors.

What is public is that the day-long delay in the swearing in of Dr Mahathir as prime minister, statements and tweets by political actors, changes at the state level of the Sabah government, and subsequent revelations of offers to the premiership to Dr. Wan Azizah Wan Ismail point to resistance inside the system to acceptance of the political mandate of Dr Mahathir. Najib’s unbecoming post-election claim that he “gave” up power, given the realities of his loss and the requirements of the Constitution, suggests that he was considering alternatives.

History will likely reveal more of this critical juncture, but here too we can look at the role of individuals, structures, and interactive processes in understanding this outcome, especially compared to other important political junctures of 1969 and 2008.

Among the individuals that will stand out in 2018 are members of the royalty, leadership of the police and civil service, and members of UMNO—insiders who opted for the turnover. My own view is that economic conditions placed greater constraints on the system, as the impact of further political turmoil and potential violence would have had a decisive impact on Malaysia. Research on critical junctures of power point to the role of pacts and cooperation, and what is striking about Malaysia’s turnover is that the pact has apparently not included Najib as he is to (rightly) face the “rule of law” for his reported abuses of power.

The electoral turnover raises issues that will shape the political path ahead—the importance of the royalty as an arbiter, the potential instability that comes with a small margin of victory in terms of seat numbers (at both the federal and in some states), and the central role that trust inside PH will play in its viability as government.

3. Reconfigured Political Actors

This segue highlights that there is now a new government and opposition. This is not just a matter of changed roles, but significantly different coalitions and relationships from the past.

Harapan may have taken over the mantle of national leadership but it is based on a different formula inside the coalition than BN. Rather than dominance of one party, there is greater equality of the different parties. How much power they will have is likely to be challenged and compromises will have to be made. Complicating this further is the pact that has shaped the future of national PH leadership: that of Mahathir’s promised transfer of leadership to Anwar.

Harapan is primarily comprised of familiar political figures, but in quite different relationships with each other. It is a relatively new coalition (together less than a year), brought together primarily for the shared goal of ousting Najib from power and secondarily to bring about further economic and political reforms. Unlike BN, there is considerable ideological difference inside the coalition, with stark differences over economic and political policies. These differences extend to different views of economic reform, affirmative action, the role of race and religion more broadly, and the scope of political reform. This is compounded by the personal tensions that have been played out publicly in the past and are likely to shape the future. How cohesive and directed Harapan will be is uncertain, but what is certain is that these relationships will be tested (and retested) in the months ahead.

Harapan faces the challenge of building trust inside itself, which is being pressured by trust it has been given by the public at large in the election. There are forces that will work to build on potential divisions, as the conservative resistance to reform in Malaysia coexists with more progressive forces.

We can again see this development tied to individuals—their ability to lead, to compromise, to get along and move forward—and their personal narratives of sacrifice and statesmanship. We can also see these developments tied to political forces and pressures in society that are likely to continue to actualise their power and put pressure on the new government from inside and in the public at large. Lessons show that greater inclusion can mitigate instability but at the same time this inclusion will require patience and hard work to resolve differences. The compromises made at the early stages of government will likely set the parameters of any reforms.

A crucial part of the new political context involves the reconfiguration of the opposition itself. As Harapan faces the pressure to become like the BN, the coalition that Tun Razak formed has died—killed by his son. The parties involved are choosing their exit strategies, seeking relevance in irrelevance for some (such as the MCA and MIC), seeking safety in place (such as many of the BN component parties in East Malaysia) or seeking a new formula for political survival. The death blow for BN in GE14 has come as a shock to many, and the BN component parties are slowly coming to terms with the reality that they are no longer in power, and no longer with the same level of access to power and state coffers.

Choices ahead will likely be contested, as each of the parties will fight over spoils and exit/future strategies. None of them have escaped severe wounds. UMNO in particular has been politically decimated, losing half of its seats—which now number 54, only 24% of the parliament. MCA has one man standing, and even this is being challenged in an election petition—MCA is essentially over as a party, with its sellout to China rather than representation of Chinese Malaysians a crucial part of its death knell.

The only real survivor will be UMNO, but the battle ahead within it will be fierce as there is contestation between “old” and “new” forces—those wanting to focus on race and religion and those wanting to move away from this model. The shadow of being declared illegal is ever-present, as Najib’s mismanagement of the party extended to putting the party’s legal future in jeopardy. UMNO will have a hard time thriving without access to state resources. Scholars are already coming together to analyse UMNO’s future—with a new revised End of UMNO? in the works—but questions of leadership, ideology and the party machinery are already being played out in public. What is clear, however, is that Najib’s leadership of the party—where he made the party his own vehicle and in effect destroyed the connection of the party to responsible national governance—will be a difficult legacy to step away from, especially given the previous acquiescence of current leadership contenders to Najib’s political excesses.

Not to be left out is the prominent role of PAS, now holding onto 18 parliamentary seats and two state governments, one of which (and arguably two) they hold due to the facilitating role of Najib’s cooperation with the party. PAS adopted a two-prong strategy in GE14: to be “open” to UMNO (thus receiving considerable support and benefitting from the erosion from this party) and to embrace an exclusionary conservative religious/racist agenda under the leadership of Ustaz Hadi Awang.

These decisions will have their own reverberations as PAS faces pressure inside its own party, especially over the alliance with UMNO. Few in PAS fully appreciate that the decisions surrounding GE14 cost them a role in the federal government and the chance to genuinely become a national party, as Hadi has relegated its political centre to its traditional base of the East Coast heartland. Perhaps even more significant will be the potential impact the change in government will have on the PAS conservative agenda, as Pakatan is arguably more secular than BN had become under Najib. How PAS moves ahead—in terms of its leadership and alliances, and its mobilisation of conservative forces in Malaysian society—are responses to the GE14 campaign itself and will set the course of the debate.

Both UMNO and PAS have been weakened by GE14, and will likely to be internally focused for some time, but the tactics they adopt ahead set the parameters for political discourse. There are considerably darker forces in Malaysia’s political life that will need to be controlled and dampened. Malaysia needs a strong constructive opposition. The battle is on for whether the new opposition will in fact be destabilising or positive for Malaysia’s future.

4. Reassessing Najibnomics and Economic Reform

Amidst these political machinations are serious demands for reform, as the GE14 has opened up long-contained cauldrons. The new government has prioritised the economy, and this is long in coming. While growth numbers have appeared positive, the fundamentals in the economy have been less favourable—as is evident in the election result against Najib. The need for substantive economic reform has been clear since the 1997 Asian financial crisis and has been exacerbated by Najib’s mismanagement of the government-linked companies and recklessness in handling national debt.

The issues go well beyond the scope of this short piece but worth highlighting given that it is essential to understand that Malaysia is now facing broad changes. Given the close ties between the economy and political life in Malaysia, changes in the economy will inevitable affect the former and vice versa.

Attention has centred on the multi-billion dollar 1MDB debacle, and Malaysia is likely to set an important international example in the implementation of the rule of law with this scandal, as Malaysians count the minute to Najib’s incarceration (as well as the disgraceful number of handbags).

There are three broad areas that are worth drawing attention to as Malaysia moves ahead—a) the future driver(s) of economic growth, b) the introduction of a needs-based social policy to address the class, racial, regional and gender inequalities and problem of contracting social mobility and c) the management of the state sector and its relationships in the political economy. All of these areas are being reassessed as the new government comes on board, highlighting that there are both opportunities and constraints in bringing about economic reform. Not least of these are different international conditions.

There is little consensus on Malaysia’s economic reform trajectory and given the lack of understanding outside of Malaysia of the appreciation for the need for greater transparency, and likely readjustment of the numbers underlying economic conditions (as the Najib administration played loose in the assumptions of its financial projections), this will be a challenging path ahead.

5. Reversal of Democratic Decay

Similar factors shape the debate over political reform. A wide-agenda has been incorporated into the Harapan manifesto, from the role of the prime minister to changes in the electoral commission. There are different priorities, further complicated by the reality that the current prime minister is responsible for deepening democratic decay. Public debate in the wake of the election has showcased the breadth of concerns—from corruption allegations against Taib Mahmud in Sarawak, to the murder of Kevin Morais and trafficking victims in Wang Kelian, as just a few examples—with different positions taken on the role of the police, civil servants and businessmen (or cronies).

Among the long list of political changes are legal reform and justice in cases, changes to political institutions to strengthen checks and balances, institutional integrity, efficiency and governance, reducing corruption, electoral reform, improving race relations and religious administration in areas such as Islamisation, protecting human rights and rebuilding of the education system—and this is not an exhaustive list. There are debates over these areas and over which should take priority, and, significantly, there is resistance to reform both inside and outside of the political system. Studies have shown repeatedly that Malaysians have different visions of democracy and their political future, with many more conservative forces for example seeing Islam as political empowerment. It would be a mistake to assume that the political polarisation of the past is not in the present, as fewer than 50% of Malaysians voted for Harapan.

Beyond different outlooks is the challenge of implementation of reform, given resistance inside the system to change and the decay of the civil service over time, in large part exacerbated by Najib’s deep spending cuts and politicisation of governance. The new government will need to remove Najib loyalists while simultaneously building on the goodwill in the system and making allies with those in the second tier of the bureaucracy.

 As Malaysia moves forward, there will be steps back, sideways and delays ahead. Leadership, socio-political conditions and interactive processes will combine to set the direction(s) ahead, which at times will likely appear contradictory and inevitably fail to meet the varied expectations of Malaysians and outsiders alike.  The last two weeks, however, are promising and speak to the bold and profound path of change that the country is embarking on. Harapan—hope—has lived up to its name—so far.











Taken from New Mandala. This article is based on the following public lecture given at the Australian National University

The GE14 aftermath: Hope and healing

Dr Mahathir Mohamad is once again Malaysia’s prime minister. Pakatan Harapan under the strategic leadership of Mahathir was able to create the perfect electoral storm to win over large shares of Umno’s base, maintain the support of the opposition and bring about Malaysia’s first change of government at the federal level in the nation’s history.

Democracy won out – the people’s votes were counted and a responsible peaceful transition of power took place. Najib Razak’s governance – the greed, the kleptocracy and the sense that he and his wife, Rosmah Mansor, were willing to sell out the country for their own interests, no matter how egregious – served to deeply alienate Malaysians across races and backgrounds and was strongly repudiated.

Millions of Malaysians took the ballot box and follow BN’s advice – ‘Make Malaysia Great Again’.

While I did see an opposition win as a viable scenario in the GE14 political storm and could feel the strong sentiments on the ground, especially as the campaign gained momentum, I was too cautious in assessing the overwhelming outpouring, weighing in on the powerholders holding on. I should have had more faith. I have long recognised the wisdom of ordinary Malaysians, and let despair, past disappointment and cynicism – in part shaped by global trends – overshadow hope.

In the wake of the Harapan victory, I begin my post-election analyses with focus on how hope can be actualised and an important healing process can begin.


Harnessing nationalism

Nationalism was a main driving force of this election as people from all walks of life voted to ‘Save Malaysia’. Most citizens put the love of their country over self-interest, following Mahathir’s own example. The BN’s emphatic loss was in large part due to its failure to look out for the interests of the country – from 1MDB to worrying investments with China.

Malaysians have long come together in crises such as the tragedies of MH370 and MH17. GE14 represented yet another coming together to address a crisis and provides a positive opportunity for Malaysians to focus on national interest, a reset button.

It is important to capitalise on this spirit of working together, as the challenges of much-needed political and economic reforms extend well beyond one man (and his wife).

Building multi-ethnic bridges

Focus has been on the multi-ethnic and national dimensions of the results. Caution is necessary in interpreting the results along these lines. While Malaysians from all walks of life voted for Harapan, the campaign was very much shaped along ethnic lines on both sides of the political divide. Even the post-election discussions of crossovers and such speak to the issue of Malay representation as opposed to others.

Ethnic mobilisation – engaging Malays – was at the heart of GE14. Umno was abandoned in large numbers with some going to Harapan, but others went to PAS. Arguably the Islamist party took more from Umno support because it was a more comfortable racialised alternative for many Malays. While Harapan took away the mantle as the protector the nation, PAS has assumed the mantle for the Malays, with religious identity at the core.

Similar strong ethnic sentiments were expressed in Sabah and Sarawak. Acknowledging the persistence of race and religion is essential for any efforts to build a stronger society.

This said, arguably at no other time in Malaysia’s history, with the exception than that of Merdeka, has there been space to reduce racism and build mutual respect across communities, to realise that Malaysians embrace multiple identities of nation, community and religion and these identities do not have to be played off against one another.

This involves an understanding that Malaysia’s strength is in fact this diversity and difference. To move away from the “us” and “them” is not easy, to try to have trust, faith, tolerance and be respectful can be even more challenging when these practices have been eroded.

Meaningful reform needs to happen to the education system where the values of division are being perpetuated. As a young nation with so much talent, creativity, capacity and hope, the decay and distortions of Malaysia’s education system (often with the frustration and anger of many hardworking teachers) is, for me as an educator, one of the worst legacies of BN governance.

Special attention needs to centre on the curriculum in religious education and revitalising arts and culture. Efforts to work toward mutual understanding have to go beyond the classroom, to build on the extensive respectful quotidian exchanges that happen across races and faiths every day.

Finding moral compass

In analysing developments in Malaysia (and elsewhere), I have regularly written about the loss of moral compass in the contemporary era. This was clearly the case among the Umno elites, some of whom wrongly still think that they did not do anything wrong. Those in leadership positions should rightly be held accountable. Moving forward, there is, however, a need for a judicious search for justice.

Practices of corruption are endemic and part of a survival mode inside the system. Some in the Harapan government are also tainted with perceptions of these practices as the ‘Umno’ culture of economic entitlement from holding office runs deep. This does not excuse them but helps us understand that the rot is systemic.

One important step could be to offer an amnesty to those who come forward, especially at the lower ranks, as a way of reaching across the system and starting fresh. This should be coupled with strengthening enforcement and incentives for good practices, a genuine commitment to anti-corruption.

Some of the crimes of the previous administration however cannot be overlooked. Not only do people like Altantuya Shaariibuu, Teoh Beng Hock, Ahmad Sarbani Mohamed, Kevin Morais, Raymond Koh, Amri Che Mat deserve the truth in their deaths and disappearances, as do countless others who died in police custody, were buried in death camps and caught up in perilous trafficking rings.

Malaysia’s illegal economy needs to be curbed, and a culture of accountability reinforced. It will be difficult to open old and sensitive wounds but learning the lessons from these experiences and building on the knowledge of the reality of the seriousness of these problems is an integral part of a new beginning, of healing.

Tackling institutional reform

It is a given that Najib did serious damage to Malaysia’s political institutions, from the judiciary and parliament to the media environment and his own party. Mahathir at the helm provides an excellent (albeit ironic) opportunity for reform, given his national and broad mandate. He can indeed correct many of the mistakes he started and has acknowledged.

Lessons show this will take time, prioritisation, trust building, patience and a serious political commitment. Simple measures to repeal draconian laws on fake news, symbolic removal of senior staff who failed in their duties in areas such as the Electoral Commission and positive reinforcement of good practices and those who supported the turnover of power, such as the inspector-general of police, can go a long way. Attention will be paid on developments in the first 100 days.

A crucial part of this institutional rebuilding involves the 1.6 million in the civil service, many of whom voted for the opposition, but also many of whom remained loyal to Umno. Keep in mind that BN won 35.4% of the country, over a third. The need for outreach to those in the system to dampen the inevitable resistant and resentments tied to entrenched practices that will come is pressing.

As stakeholders and implementors, civil servants are crucial for any successful institutional reform. In moments of change, it is always prudent to look for potential allies and be cautious in rushing to judgement. This does not mean to ignore real threats. GE14 shows, however, that surprising allies can indeed lead to even more surprising outcomes.

Embracing social transformation

Equally substantive challenges remain in Malaysia’s economy, as acknowledged by Malaysia’s new leadership. Despite platitudes to the contrary, Malaysia is still caught in a middle-income trap. It does not yet have a clear strategy ahead to move out of it. The focus on infrastructure as a driver of growth needs to be complemented with more alternatives.

Serious thought needs to be placed on reforms in the agricultural sector to diversify from palm oil dominance. Equally valuable is consideration of how to strengthen services and ratchet up technology. There are seasoned experts inside the new leadership who understand that vision and long-term planning are better than short-term deals to pay off loans and address scandals. A thorough clean-up of 1MDB and the GLCs (government-linked companies) will go a long way to bringing investment into Malaysia.

The populist thrusts of the GE14 campaign messages tap into real needs in society. Broadly, growing inequality, declining social mobility and persistent precarity of large shares of Malaysians underscored the resentments toward the Najib government. The GST showcased these vulnerabilities.

Throwing money at these problems through cash transfers such as BR1M did not go to the core of these problems. The poverty and underdevelopment in places such as Sabah, Sarawak and Felda areas remains serious. Equally significant are conditions in northern Terengganu and Kelantan, who cannot be left out of any new sets of initiatives even though they are opposition states.

GE14 opens up the path for a social transformation, as did the critical juncture of 1969. If there was one positive from Najib’s decade in office, it is that he moved to embrace a more needs-based approach in social policy. This thinking can be foundational in the transformation, as an approach that focuses on one community at the expense of the other, for that race and not another, is part of the reason Malaysia is in the difficulties it now is.

This does not mean that policies cannot be sensitive to ethnic identities and social conditions, and policies will need to be adjusted to address the variation within Malaysia, whether it is rural Pensiangan or urban Kerinchi (not Bangsar South). Now, however, there is an opportunity to have a meaningful discussion about social problems and how they affect the economy and vice versa.

Healthcare, gender relations, family structure and religion are an integral part of robust discussions of policy reform. GE14 may have been essentially devoid of policy debate, but its outcome opens up the possibility of moving political discussions in a new direction.

Harapan now has the support and goodwill of most Malaysians. Managing expectations and living up to the promise that GE14 has brought about will be a large responsibility. Healing the wounds inside the system and the country as a whole are essential to meet these responsibilities.

If there was one lesson I learned in GE14, it is to have more faith … and hope.















Taken from malaysiakini.com

Malaysia Calls On Authoritarian Regimes To Monitor Its Democratic Elections!

The Malaysian Election Commission has just issued a staggering list of seven countries which they say have taken up its offer to come and monitor the up-coming elections to ensure they are free and fair – and free from fraud.

The list includes three of the world’s most authoritarian regimes; two countries described as ‘Hybrid’ (part-authoritarian) by The Economist Democracy Index and two ‘Flawed Democracies’ under the same index. One of the countries has just come out of a state of emergency following a blatant coup against the rule of law and is not even rated on the index.

Malaysians will be left wondering if this is an idea of a bad joke on the part of Najib and his flunkies at the EC or whether he has set out to humiliate his own country in a misguided attempt to rebuff the apparent insult by Britain, Europe and Australia, who have expressed concerns about the conduct of GE14?

As every Malaysian knows, Prime Minister Najib Razak has described Malaysia as a ‘perfect’ democracy and has in the past resisted the idea that the country should be insulted by the imposition of external election monitors, a measure urged by NGOs and the opposition.

Despite numerous reports and judicial complaints about bribery, coercion and blatant cheating at previous elections Najib stated in January, for example, that”the chances of cheating are non-existent”.  Over the weekend his Foreign Minister retorted to the UK’s suggestion of election monitors by thundering:

Malaysian democracy is to be monitored by the Malaysian electorate, and the Malaysian electorate alone. To assume that anyone else has the right, ability and competence is an insult to each and every Malaysian voter. [Anifah Aman]

In fact, Malaysia is rated as a far from perfect democracy in the international independant rankings, and all denizens will know why. It comes 59th on the list of 168 countries in The Economist’s list, just above Mongolia, and it is placed in the category of a ‘Flawed Democracy”.

The message is therefore clear.  If Malaysia was willing to bring standards of better practice to the monitoring of GE14, there are 58 countries above it in the rankings to which the Election Commission could turn for support.

These include 19 countries from around the world, which are described as ‘Full Democracies’ in the rankings. However, instead, Najib and his Election Commission cronies have, in this semi-Uturn, resorted to some of the world’s most repressive governments to profer their monitoring support.

These include authoritarian regimes, whose expertise lies more in the stage management of pretend elections, rather than the holding of genuine elections.  Is that the sort of advice and supervision that Najib is actually looking for?

If so, Malaysians have even more reason to be worried about the conduct of GE14 than before.

Malaysia’s Chosen ‘Democracy’ Oberservers So Far

So, let’s look at the list of countries that the Election Commission has invited to observe GE14, according to today’s reports.

Firstly, you have Azerbaijan and Cambodia, which come 148 and 124 out of the 168 countries on the Democracy Index respectively and are described as Authoritarian Regimes.

Next, you have Thailand, which suffered an army coup in 2014 and remains under martial law.  The army have been signalling they will hold elections again at some point, but they have kept arbitrarily delaying that date – a planned election last year has been postponed till this year, with no guarantees.

On that basis the country comes 107 on the index and is described as a ‘Hybrid Regime’.

The other Hybrid Regime is Kyrgyzstan. This deserves some plaudits for being the only country in post-Soviet Central Asia that has achieved any form of democracy, but this is by virtue of having held its first ever peaceful transfer of power involving elections (if suspect) just last year. Good on Kyrgyzstan, but has it got guidance on democracy to support Malaysia?

We then have two so-called  ‘Flawed Democracies’, including nearby Indonesia, which these days looks near to beating Malaysia on the Democracy Index (it was a much reversed situation a decade or so ago), standing at number 68.

Following that, an relatively impressively placed, if tiny, Timor Leste, which has put to one side former years of dreadful fighting and repression to stand at number 43 on the list, well above Malaysia.

What tips Najib and the Election Commission may be hoping to gain from the emissaries of these countries; how many observers each will send or how these folk will be deployed and managed remains a mystery.  One thing is certain there isn’t much time to organise them.

However, it is perhaps the final country on the list that is most baffling, but perhaps most telling.

The Maldives have been in a State of Emergency since the start of the year as, beset by corruption allegations, President Abdulla Yameen pitched himself into an outright confrontation with his own justice system and Supreme Court.

January 29, 2018 the Supreme Court received a petition from the opposition alliance in the Maldives to temporarily remove President Abdulla Yameen Abdul Gayoom and appoint investigators to look into allegations of corruption and misrule.

Following on from this, on February 1st, the Court ruled that the trial against the former President Nasheed, which began in 2012, was unconstitutional and also ordered the release of nine opposition MPs, resulting in an opposition majority in the Maldives.

Nasheed responded with a 45 day  State of Emergency in February (that was then extended for another 30 days) and not only that, he ordered the arrest of two Supreme Court judges, including the Chief Justice, as heavily armed troops stormed the country’s top court.

He also arrested his half-brother the former president Maumoon Abdul Gayoom.

According to Amnesty International Yameen has also outlawed peaceful protests, and has been imprisoning people solely for exercising their rights to freedom of expression and peaceful assembly.“While some protestors have since been released, many of those arrested during the state of emergency remain under detention.” [Amnesty]

Why, one wonders, did Najib’s Election Commission think it was appropriate to ring up the Government of President Yameen, under such circumstances, to ask if he could help with supplying observers for the upcoming election?

After all, Yameen must be pretty preoccupied.

GE14 unknowns: Malaysia’s highly competitive polls

Most analysts will tell you that BN will emphatically win the coming May 9 election. I am not most analysts. While I agree with the dominant argument that BN goes into GE14 with significant structural advantages and the ruling coalition is a strong favourite to win, the campaign is fluid and riddled with uncertainties.

Compared to 2013, this election has more competitive seats and more unknowns. No one can predict the outcome with certainty. Below I outline five issue areas that make GE14 arguably one of Malaysia’s most competitive, suggesting that much of what is happening in the election to date is evolving in the last few weeks of the campaign, and as such GE14’s outcome and that of Malaysia’s political future is very much in the balance.

1. Tighter contests

In 2013, nearly 50% of the seats (111 of 222) were competitive, with 32% of the seats won by less than 10%. Most of these close seats were fierce battles, some of which came down to blackouts, postal votes and multi-cornered splitting of the opposition vote. Polling agents were often unsung heroes. Recall that in four parliamentary seats in Sabah, opposition differences resulted in BN winning them - Keningau, Kota Marudu, Pensiangan and Tenom.

In 2018, around 65% of the seats (144) are estimated to be competitive, meaning that these seats can be won by less than a 10% margin. This increase is the product of three issues: 1) three-cornered fights, 2) the entrance of Bersatu, and 3) greater convergence of local opposition in Sabah. Three-cornered fights (a topic that will be developed in more detail in a later piece), disproportionately advantage the BN, but in the process, they make the margins of victory lower.

PAS is reportedly slating candidates in 126 seats, which will make multi-cornered contests a nationwide phenomenon. Slimmer margins make for more competitiveness and surprises. At the same time, traditional seats like Pagoh and Langkawi – while also favour BN despite the fielding of Bersatu heavyweights– now join the competitive seat list. We also see more competitive seats in Kedah and Johor.

Finally, while Sabah politics continues to be multi-party, the localisation of the opposition increases the political salience of ethnic and personal loyalties and, combined with the wave toward Borneo empowerment, makes for closer contests.

2. Leadership legacies

In 2013, the election was about caretaker prime minister Najib Razak. This time around it is the same, except rather than serving as a strength for BN, he is a liability with record levels of antipathy against him and his wife, Rosmah Mansor. If Najib really wanted his coalition to win positively, he would have stepped down. As such, the election appears to be about his survival, not the interests of his party or the country.

Opposition leader Dr Mahathir Mohamad is also a divisive figure, similarly evoking strong emotions from critics. The sense of relief when Mahathir stepped down from office in 2003 was palpable. While corruption levels were not as high as Najib’s tenure, Mahathir did similarly undermine the democratic fabric of Malaysia.

His return at 92, evoking a sense of statesmanship for the country, appears less about personal interest than that of Najib. It is deeply ironic that one of the leaders who did the most damage to political institutions is now the defender of democracy in Malaysia.

The stark Najib-Mahathir face-off focuses heavily on different perceptions of the legacies of their past tenures, forcing voters to opt for the least-opposed candidate. This inevitably has led to resistance among some voters to either choice. The challenge for both leaders is to convince voters that they offer something meaningful for the country’s future. This is playing out in the campaign.

3. Undecided voters, reduced turnout

Less than one month away from GE14, credible polls suggest that over a third of registered voters are estimated to be still undecided. In 2013, only 15% went into the election campaign without a clear choice. The 2018 campaign will matter, as it will determine which party will tip the balance in voting.

A crucial part of the decision will be whether to vote at all. Voter turnout reached a record high of 85% in 2013. All indications are that turnout will drop this time around, as shown in the Sarawak 2016 polls which saw a turnout of 66%. The decision to put the election on a Wednesday aims to reduce turnout further, and this is enhanced by indecision among the electorate itself.

Whichever party brings voters to the polls will have the advantage. The BN’s machinery is stronger, fuelled by its resource advantage. It traditionally has the stronger record on bringing its base out to vote. Given the antipathy towards Najib among many in the BN base itself, the higher turnout for the BN is not guaranteed.

At the same time, the opposition has greater obstacles getting its voters out compared to 2013, given the loss of PAS which served as the machinery backbone for Pakatan Rakyat. All of Pakatan Harapan parties by contrast have comparatively weak machinery. With less money in the 2018 campaign compared to 2013 to date for the opposition, this potentially weakens turnout for the opposition further – adding to the competitiveness.

4. Prominent identity politics

The sensitive issues of race and religion lurk closely below the surface in this campaign. In the past five years, the Najib government has pitted Chinese against Malays openly with its zero-sum characterisation of the 2013 vote as a “Chinese tsunami”.

The labelling of the opposition of 2018 as a “Malay tsunami” follows the same ethnic framing, putting the question of Malay unity and the role of non-Malays centre stage in the current political contest. While interpersonal race relations remain largely cordial, the politicisation of race and power creates undercurrents that cannot be fully controlled or predicted.

To further complicate this dynamic, PAS is articulating its own “pure” Islamic agenda, having nothing meaningful to offer in other areas of governance. While Umno tacitly supports this agenda –  contributing to the narrative of ratcheting up religious differences as a reason to vote in GE14 – religion has moved from a question of religious freedoms to religious dominance and displacement.

Rather than building bridges across the faiths, the campaigns by PAS and to some extent Umno, are more about exclusion and the primacy of one community’s rights over others. This also taps into highly emotive and unpredictable dimensions.

5. Post-election questions

Najib is also no Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, whose gentlemanly sense of fairness accepted the results of the 2008 campaign.

With charges of kleptocracy shadowing Najib, legitimate questions are being asked whether he would accept the results. The same can be said for the opposition as well, which has witnessed the Najib government introduce even more structural unfairness in the electoral process in areas such as the delineation. This excessive unfairness has sadly delegitimised the elections among many and fuelled anger, creating greater risks for acceptance of electoral outcomes.

Nevertheless, both BN and the opposition are living in their own political echo chambers, both sides are confident of winning. They have drunk their own rose syrup, not fully appreciating that many Malaysians stand on the sidelines, watching and deciding which electoral party to attend. The mood is not yet one dominated by celebration and hope, rather one permeating with uncertainty and indecision.

The campaign will matter more than is realised, and as such, every vote will matter.